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Abstract:

Classical natural law still retains its deep transcendental roots, i.e. ancient
Greek cosmology, although it is no longer based on theodicy. The oldest
meaning of the universe (kosmos) is not nature, but order. Therefore, the
universe is larger than nature. Cosmology, which takes a holistic approach
to everything, is superior to reason or ontology, which underlies modern
natural law and is essentially a mechanistic worldview. Classical natural
law does not regard reason as the ultimate cause to avoid the disconnection
of “form” from “substance,” which is a disadvantage of modern thought
resulting in a loss of regulative capacity. The eternal recurrence (ewige
Wiederkehr) of natural law requires us to constantly revisit the idea of
classical natural law in order to find a real footing for the salvation of
reality.
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U

nlike modern natural law, which is self-evidently rational, classical
natural law exhibited inherent conflicts and struggles right from
the very beginning and underwent a rather long process of integration before
reluctantly coming into being under the name natural law. Thus, to modern
people, natural law is the inherent law of the universe or reason, an objective
standard for determining what is right and wrong, and a ready-made “higher
law.” To ancient people, however, the term natural law itself was questionable,
as behind it lay a paradox of choice concerning fundamental issues of human
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thought, such as rationality versus enlightenment, the sacred versus the secular, vindication of God
versus vindication of man, ancestry versus mastery (or, in Confucian terms, “following the earlier
kings” versus “following the later kings”), revolution versus conformity, democracy versus tyranny,
necessity versus freedom, and will versus norm.
How did the “nature-law” issue become inherently conflicting? Why did nature and law
clash with each other in a particular historical period? What was the relationship between
nature and law prior to the emergence of their conflict?
Originally, all was under law (themis or nomos) and all natural beings (physis) in the universe
were subordinate to law. In such a context, nature and law were inclusive and free from any
conflict. Even with new meanings added, physis remained highly consistent with nomos in terms
of purposiveness and sacredness and even retained original unity in terms of social or group
functions, otherwise the later emergence of natural law would not have been possible. With the
rise of reason, however, religious beliefs, which were the basis of “law,” became the target of
attack. The nature-law conflict that emerged during that period was in fact first manifested as a
fundamental conflict between reason and faith, or between religion and philosophy in the form
of either safeguarding or rebelling against tradition. Using the nature of things as a weapon, the
revolutionaries opposed the confinement of outdated dogmas and all nomos (which stood for
norm).
Recent studies of natural law slightly resemble classical natural law for being a “problem”
itself. Yet, the respective problems they deal with are essentially different. The school of new
natural law tries to counter legal positivism with the old nomos (or rather, classical natural
law) “shields perceptions of the current world situation from the confusion of legal positivism”
(Schmitt, 2006, p. 69. Cf; George, 1999, pp. 17ff), the erosion of skepticism, the poisoning of
atheism and the resulting ethical relativism in absinkende Zeit, and to eventually allow us to
escape extinction in the surge of nihilism. Nevertheless, the modern physics-based concept
of physis is in nature a mechanistic cosmology, which has no place for natural law and leaves
physis itself, the very foundation of natural law in ontology unsettled (to say nothing of the
existence of the gods). As a result, “Thus positivism, which was now beginning its triumphal
march, obtained its laurels all too easily, since it was indeed able to vanquish this historical
form of a philosophy of law which called itself natural law, but not the idea itself of natural law”
(Rommen, 1998, p. 96). Thus, however hard the academics try to revive natural law, it remains
highly questionable whether they will manage to solve what they are trying to solve—that is the
most fundamental issue facing the current study of natural law.

Cosmology as the Basis of Classical Natural Law
To the ancients, the idea of nature or universe itself was characterized by personality, which
means it signified human emotions (pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy), will and purpose. Most
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importantly, as nature or universe was believed to have been divinely ordained or created, it
was endowed with divinity.① In this way, natural law and divine law were connected by one
similarity, namely cosmology. Heraclitus considered divine law to be a natural law reflected in
the law and relevance of the universe, “His divine law is a law of nature, manifesting itself in
cosmic regularities and reciprocities, the sun’s diurnal rotation, seasonal changes, and the cycle
of life and death. It also appears to be natural, as distinct from human, law, with a universal,
authoritative, and objective scope that civic laws can at best seek to approximate” (Long, 2005,
p. 418). Natural law, which was close to divine law, was mainly reflected in the “continuous
emergence of the new” in the universe. According to Heraclitus, natural law exists in the law
of the universe, or can be understood as the law of the universe itself. By law of the universe,
he meant “cosmic justice,” rather than “cosmic law.” Likewise, the idea of natural law did not
appear as a form of normative integration in the golden age of the ancient Greek civilization,
when dike (justice) was preferred to nomos (although the term dike was of judicial significance).
The “natural justice” in ancient Greek sense corresponded to the so-called “natural law” which
appeared later (Plato, The Republic, n.d., 501b, The Laws, n.d., 889d-890d, Timaeus, n.d., 83e4-5;
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, n.d., 5.105; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, n.d.,
1134b-1135a).
In the view of the ancients, the universe itself, which includes the sun, the moon and the
stars, and witnesses the lapse of seasons and years, is sufficient to prove the existence of the
gods (Plato, ca. 360 B.C.E., The Laws, 885e-886a). The gods control the repeated changes of
nature (Plato, ca. 360 B.C.E., The Laws, 715e-716a); the fundamental law for the harmonious
coexistence of all things in the universe should be the goal of mankind, or should at least make
man devout and kind (Plato, Epinomis 990a; Cicero, On the Laws. 2.16, On the Commonwealth
1.26, 6.20-29, 2.16). It was precisely in the context of divine law that Plato sought support for
cosmology.
Unlike the Hebrew God who created everything, the ancient Greek gods were responsible
only for “ordering” the universe. The word theos (gods) in ancient Greek came from tithemi
(meaning “to put”). Originally, everything was out of order. It was the gods that “put things
in order” (die-kosm-ēsen), integrated them into a whole, namely, the universe (kosmos) and
endowed the whole world with sacredness, naturalness, purposiveness and morality (Plato,
Timaeus, 69c). In ancient Greek, both “the universe” and “order” were referred to as kosmos.
Now that kosmos covered “nature” and “law”, there was “natural law” in the kosmos.
Cicero echoed the idea more bluntly, “The immortal gods implanted souls in human bodies
so as to have beings who would care for the earth and who, while contemplating the celestial
order (caelestium ordinem), would imitate it in the moderation and consistency (constantia)
① Nature is purposeful, rather than accidental or spontaneous (Aristotle, The physic, n.d., 198b34-199a2). In this regard, similar ideas can be found in ancient
Chinese philosophies. For example, Dong Zhongshu said, “Just like man, the heaven also has its own emotions (pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy). It is precisely
this similarity that enables interaction and harmony between man and heaven ” (Dong, 1992, p. 341).
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of their lives” (Cicero, trans. 1923). Constantia is eternity, which is also one of the essentials
of natural law. The movement of celestial bodies and the change of seasons are the law of
“nature,” and also the law that man should imitate (Cicero, ca. 352 B.C.E., On the laws 1.61,
2.16). Obedience to “obey this celestial order (caelesti descriptioni), the divine mind and the
all-powerful god” (Cicero, ca. 52 On the Laws 1.23) is obedience to natural law and divine law,
for the basis of natural law is celestial regency. Similar ideas can be found in ancient Chinese
philosophy, too. Mozi once said, “What then should be taken as the standard in government?
Nothing better than following Heaven. Heaven is all-inclusive and impartial in its activities,
abundant and unceasing in its blessings, and lasting and untiring in its guidance. And, so,
when the sage-kings had accepted Heaven as their standard, they measured every action and
enterprise by Heaven. What Heaven desired they would carry out, what Heaven abominated
they refrained from” (Mozi, Fayi). Laozi held that “the ‘Tao’ (the divine law) follows nature”
(Laozi, Laozi) because “Heaven is the divine law, and the divine law is eternal” (Laozi, Laozi).
Later, Dong Zhongshu advocated “following the laws of Heaven and nature” (Dong, n.d.).
Cosmology as the basis of classical natural law was not debated in ancient times. But in
modern times, cosmology may sound old-fashioned, unscientific or even superstitious to
people, who may thus oppose classical natural law and eventually make (classical) natural law
no longer possible. Or to flip it around, with cosmology as a divine teleology, along with the
holistic mindset abandoned by modern people, natural law loses ground and inevitably comes
to an end. Under such circumstances, a careful examination of the positive senses and possible
limits of classical cosmology is needed.
From a contemporary perspective, classic natural law is associated with an antiquated
classical cosmology, which, however, seems to have been found untrue by the huge
achievements of modern science. Is that true? Leo Strauss did not think so, holding that modern
natural sciences, however successful they become, had no impact on our understanding of
“what is human in man” at all. Modern natural sciences no longer see the universe and human
nature as “the whole,” making “man as man wholly unintelligible.” “The whole is of mysterious
character, and man’s openness to the whole contains the quest for cosmology” (Strauss, 1988,
p. 39). Classical cosmology is an organic and holistic view, while modern cosmology is an
outcome of mechanical technology. To the ancient Greeks, “heaven and earth and gods and men
are bound together by communion and friendship, orderliness, temperance, and justice, and it
is for that reason they call this Whole a Cosmos” (Plato, ca. 380 B.C.E., 508a). This view was
proposed some 2,000 years earlier than das Geviert, which was proposed by Martin Heidegger
with great effort. From a holistic perspective, cosmology is more brilliant than ontology. But
the general history of philosophy wrongly assumes it is a historical progress to shift from
cosmology to ontology, and to epistemology and the study of speech.
Without a holistic cosmology, man, the gods and the universe would be separated from
each other and have no relevance to each other; everything would turn into an atomic natural
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element; the meaning of life would be buried in “science.” What makes classical cosmology
superior to modern cosmology is that classical cosmology retains a concern for humanity.
When Descartes’ universe replaced Aristotle’s, and when a universe made up of nature was
replaced by a vast thing—the extension (whose components, arrangement and reorganization
allowed itself to be handled perfectly in a mathematical way), we had to cope with a picture
of the world in which the teleological elements are as irrelevant as the elements of color and
taste are to geometry (Simon, 2016, p. 91). This mechanistic view of the universe, which started
from Descartes, was already common in Plato’s time (Plato, ca. 360 B.C.E., Laws 889b-c). It
goes without saying that there can be no such thing as natural law in a thoroughly mechanistic
universe (Simon, 2016, p. 93).① Strauss thus asked, “What is wrong with cosmology? What is
wrong with man’s attempt to find his bearing on the basis of what is apparent to him as a man?”
(Strauss, 1997, p. 371). The contemplation of the divine principle in classical philosophy is not a
value-neutral, objective study purely in search of knowledge, but a basis “by which we are led
to the right conduct” (Strauss, 1997, p. 373). The fundamental teaching of classical thought is
“know thyself,” which is primarily about finding one’s place in the universe—one of the most
important teachings of classical cosmology and its resulting theory of natural law.

The Place of Reason in Classical Natural Law
In ancient times, Natural law is a “divine gift,” and as long as natural law exists, it seems
to be natural and rightful. Even so, natural law itself is not self-evident. Therefore, our
understanding of natural law requires the intervention of human reason. Although natural law
in Ulpian’s term refers to something that nature gave to all living things (natura omnia animalia
docuit) (Justinian, 1989, p. 6), there is no doubt that only humans can experience and even
participate in the laws of the universe. After all, of all creatures, only humans have reason. This
close association of reason with natural law can easily lead to the misconception that natural
law, which can only be understood through reason, is nothing more than a product of reason.
Such a misconception, however, is made by modern natural law.② Besides, even if reason and
natural law can hardly be separated from each other, there is still a world of difference between
the “reason” of today and the “reason” in ancient times in terms of meaning and limit.
Reason: Not the Ultimate Cause
The ancients considered rational beings more noble than irrational beings. To them, the
① The natural teleology held by Morelly in Code of Nature (1982, p. 21) is in fact a mechanistic view of nature (p. 24). Given that, Morelly’s citation of Cicero
was essentially a misunderstanding. Strauss criticized the mechanistic view of the universe but defended Aristotle’s teleological view of the universe (Strauss,
2003, p. 8).
② Pound’s understanding of natural law in Roman law is very modern, as the natural law in his vision is in fact an equivalent to modern natural law. “Natural
law is a discursive legal style……It originates from reason and is constructed in a philosophical way. The creative application of this ideal helps outline the
characteristics of the classical Roman law-governed era” (Pound, 2004, p. 36).
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gods are the noblest of all beings and therefore deservedly possess absolute reason. The goal
of man is to use reason or rationality as a means to find ways to “resemble the gods,” i.e., to
move towards or approach divinity and achieve perfection as much as possible, which is known
as natural law (Plato, Timaeus, 90c6-d7). Cicero argued, “Those who have been given reason
by nature have also been given right reason, and therefore law too, which is right reason in
commands and prohibitions; and if they have been given law, then they have been given justice
too” (Cicero, Ca. 360 B.C.E., On the Laws, 1.33). Natural reason (naturalis ratio) reveals law①
and, more importantly, it is in itself lex divina et humana (Cicero, On obligations, n.d, 3.23, On
divination, n.d., 1.90, 1.30, 2.37; Plato, Minos, n.d., 316b5, Theaetetus, n.d., 172b, 177d; Aristotle,
Rhetoric, n.d., 1375a31-b5).
According to the theory of classical natural law, “Law is the highest reason, rooted in
nature……when this same reason is secured and established in the human mind (mente), it is
law” (Cicero, ca. 360 B.C.E., On the Laws, 1.18); “virtue evidently consists in perfect reason and
this certainly resides in nature” (Cicero, ca. 360 B.C.E., On the Laws, 1.25, 56). The “reason”
here does not refer to anyone’s reason, or human reason, but a “universal” reason. Natural law
is more of an outcome of divine reason. The theory of modern natural law, however, relies on
individualistic rationalism, with the result that abstract humanity, rather than divinity, becomes
the basis of natural law. Hugo Grotius made it clear that “the mother of right—that is, of natural
law—is human nature” (Grotius, p. 1749; Pound, 2004, p. 48).② His words marked a watershed.
“For henceforth not God’s essence, but human nature, viewed existentially as well as merely
in the abstract, would be regarded as the source of natural law” (Rommen, 2007, p. 88). As
a result, the basis of natural law becomes an imagined state of nature. But Thomas Aquinas
long ago warned, “It does not suffice that it advance from first principles implanted by nature”
(Aquinas, 2000, p. 12).
While sacred, reason is not supreme and is essentially a means to the end of virtue. Reason
has a significant capacity to enable an understanding of natural law, but its capacity is bound
to be limited. In other words, classical natural law recognizes that law comes from “right
reason,” but reason is not the ultimate cause, which comes from the divine. Without the divine,
there would be nothing in the universe more remarkable than man. This assumption, i.e. nonexistence of the divine, is summae adrogantiae and even sane adrogantis. Yet, this invalid
assumption became a reliable logical premise (non esse Deum) to Grotius.
Aquinas proclaimed, “Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles
impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human
conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of
things that are from nature” (Aquinas, 2016, p. 20). Thus, the reason which classical natural law

① Huang Feng, translator of Gai institutiones (Chinese edition) translated naturalis ratio into “natural reason” in Chinese (Gaius, 1996, p. 2).
② In Finnis’ view, Aristotle (Metaphysics, n.d., 1070a12, 1015a14-15) and Aquinas had built natural law on human nature (Finnis, 2011, p. 103).
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resorts to is far from (modern) rationalism. “The proud spirit of modern rationalism is lacking.
There is no assertion of man’s self-sufficiency and inherent perfection. There is no vindication
of abstract ‘rights’ nor of the autonomy of the individual as the ultimate source of all laws and
of all standards” (D’Entreves, 2008, pp. 50-51). In the ancients’ view, great reason in itself
needs to be supported or even proved by other evidence; reason is not, after all, ultimate. And
“there is in (classical nature law) no trace whatever of the extravagances of the rationalistic
natural law current in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Rommen, 2007, p. 49). The
difference between classical natural law and modern natural law lies in the fact that the former
denies natural law to be an outcome of reason, while the latter, having eliminated deism, can
only base natural law on reason and consider natural law to be an outcome of self-deduction
through speculative reason (Kant, 1781, Axx, Bxiii, B780).
The Finitude of Reason
Any finite being in this world features a paradoxical duality, with both advantages and
disadvantages. To the ancients, god-given reason is admittedly keen (Cicero, On moral ends,
5.57). Yet, wrong application of reason makes one suffer the consequences. After all, no bad
thing is the masterwork of bona ratio (Cicero, On divination, 3.71). To the ancients, reason is
great and therefore needs to be treated with more caution. “The greater and more divine their
superiority, the greater their need of assiduous care. And so reason if well employed (adhibita)
sees clearly what is best; if left neglected it is entangled in a multitude of deceptions.” (Cicero,
Tusculan disputations, 4.58). Elsewhere, Cicero thoroughly reflected on the finitude of reason:
God gives us only reason, assuming that in fact he does; whether it is good or bad depends
on ourselves. When reason is bestowed upon a person by the gods’ gift, it is not analogous to
a bequest left to us, for if they had wished to harm us what better could they have bestowed
on mankind? If reason does not underlie injustice, lack of restraint and cowardice, from what
seeds would these vices sprout? (Cicero, On the nature of the gods, 3.71)
The evil in the world is also the “masterwork” of reason. Given that, reason is not
omnipotent, let alone the best. In essence, reason is not the god. In fact, Socrates had long
since sharply criticized the then roaring wave of rationalism. He was originally convinced by
Anaxagoras’ theory of mind (nous), but later discovered this theory to be a hubristic nonsense.
According to Socrates, Anaxagoras’ theory, which held that mind organizes (diakosmōn) and
arranges (kosmein) all things, including the universe (kosmos), was theoretically groundless
and sacrilegious. That was why Socrates took a different route and started his famous “second
voyage” (Socrates, Phaedo. 97c-99d). Modern scholars have also recognized that reason can
lead man astray. To them, it is no surprise that under such circumstances this reason turned into
one of the most dangerous tools of vices and took the wrong turning (Morelly, 1982, p. 30).
Reason is often compared to the sun, for it enables us to see everything more clearly, “but
we cannot stare at the sun long, for the light would ruin our eyes” (Plato, Phaedo, 99d5-7).
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The sun (reason) can nourish all things. But excessive sun exposure can cause a “house fire.”
There are some modern thinkers “having their eyes hurt” due to their addiction to reason. It
has become an irreversible fact that their over-amplification of the brilliance of reason gave rise
to an extensive crisis in modern philosophy. The explanation is as follows, “The rationalism
of the Encyclopedists, making of natural law no longer an offspring of creative wisdom but a
revelation of reason unto itself, transformed natural law into a code of absolute and universal
justice inscribed in nature and deciphered by reason as an ensemble of geometric theorems or
speculative data” (Maritain, 2009, pp. 74-75).
Suarez, Grotius, Descartes and Pufendorf endowed reason with infinite power, making
the objective order of all things (ordo rerum) and also natural law, which was based on it,
superfluous. To them, human reason was supreme; while to ordinary people, their ego and
everything related to it were directly guaranteed via “I think.” Man becomes an angel because
he has reason. Modern rational epistemology is angelic epistemology in essence. “Rationalism
soon made human reason and its innate ideas the measure of what is. Human reason could
now indulge in the uncontrolled construction of systems that have characterized the natural
law of rationalism” (Rommen, 2007, pp. 80-81). Nevertheless, this anthroposophical angelism
was bound to degenerate, and reason would not be able to support human morality and would
eventually be taken over by economic status. Modern scholars such as John Finnis, having
abandoned metaphysics, tried to develop a doctrine of natural law without nature. The natural
law in the age of naturalism, individualism, radicalism and rationalism eventually became the
founder and gravedigger of modern thoughts.

The Form and Substance of Natural Law
In classical thought, reason is an external cognitive faculty with specific connotations.
Natural law is right reason, whose rightness is reflected in its guidance to virtue. Thus, virtue
is the connotation of reason and is also the main target of classical natural law (Laertius, Lives
of eminent philosophers, 7.94). Natural law is called the “teacher of life” because it is in itself the
leges vivendi et disciplinam or vivendi doctrina (Cicero, ca. 360 B.C.E., On the Laws, 1.57, 1.58)
Strauss concluded, “Natural law directs man toward his perfection, the perfection of a rational
and social animal; it is ‘the guide of life and the teacher of the duties’ (Cicero, On the nature of
the gods, 1.40); it is the dictate of reason regarding human life. Thus, the virtuous life as choiceworthy for its own sake comes to be understood as compliance with natural law—with a law,
and hence as a life of obedience. Inversely, the content of natural law is the whole of virtue”
(Strauss, 1983, p. 141).
Classical natural law values reason, but it ultimately aims at virtue and happiness in
order to safeguard human interests (Cicero, On obligations, 3.31). If such content is still not
deemed substantive enough, the classical view of reason and its implicated natural law also
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have concrete provisions concerning reverence for the gods, defense of mother country, filial
devotion to parents, and loyalty to brothers and friends. “If nature does not ratify law, then
all the virtues may lose their sway. For what becomes of generosity, patriotism, or friendship?
Where will the desire of benefitting our neighbors, or the gratitude that acknowledges kindness,
be able to exist at all? For all these virtues proceed from our natural inclination to love
mankind. And this is the true basis of justice, and without this not only the mutual charities
of men, but the religious services of the gods, would be at an end” (Cicero, Ca. 360 B.C.E.,
On the Laws., 1.43). All these virtues (reverence, sincerity, loyalty, filial piety, fraternity and
kindheartedness) are the inherent connotations of classical natural law or classical rationality.
Through continued deification of its content, reason was eventually brought to its climax
by Kant and Hegel, to whom everything could be deduction from reason. “Human reason now
becomes the sovereign architect of the order of knowledge; it becomes the measure of things.
The objective basis of natural law, the ordo rerum and the eternal law, has vanished. What was
termed natural law is a series of conclusions drawn from the categorical imperative and from
the regulative ideas of practical reason, not from the objective and constitutive ordo rerum”
(Rommen, 1998, p. 78). The true meaning of the “our faculty of understanding is the primary
source of nature’s lawfulness” is that human reason is the source of natural law. Natural law is
primarily about safeguarding free will. The “categorical imperative” or “definitive imperative”
of natural law becomes an empty form. “Act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant, 1997, p. 31). The
“categorical imperative” of this universal natural law (allgemeinen Naturgesetze) seems similar
to the quote by Confucius—“Do not do unto others what you do not want done unto you”
(Confucius, Duke Ling of Wei, The analects of Confucius). But Confucius also specified what
must be obeyed in conduct and behavior beyond this formal principle, while Kant did not teach
anything substantive in this rational “categorical imperative.”
Johann Gottlieb Fichte also expressed an idea similar to Kant’s “categorical imperative.”
He said, “The principle of any judgment of right is that each is to limi his freedom, the sphere
of his free actions, through the concept of the freedom of the other (so that the other, as free
in general, can exist as well)” (Fichte, 2000, p. 102). But mankind had struggled in this vast
ocean of “freedom” for centuries before a narrow escape from drowning. They became more
and more aware of the fact that freedom, although being the basis of modern natural law, has
no substance at all. If not carefully distinguished, concepts like freedom, equality, natural state,
will and absolute rights can be a mirage leading to nowhere.
Modern natural law is based on the scientific “natural law” or “law of nature” (Gierke, 1934,
p. 35)①. But unfortunately, “the ‘natural law’ of the natural sciences only denotes a calculable

① According to Gierke (1934, p. 35), a leading scholar of natural law, it was the “law of nature” that led to the disintegration of the medieval concept of natural
law. John Locke directly applied “law of nature” in the sense of natural law (Locke, 2014).
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function without substance” (Schmitt, 2006, p. 72). Just like philosophical positivism, scientific
natural law has no interest in core issues such as “origin” and “root” and therefore becomes
homeless and rootless. Pufendorf (and Hobbes) and Cicero all understood natural law as an
outcome of “right reason.” Cicero specified what reason was right (Cicero, On obligations),
while Pufendorf just mentioned this “right reason” in vague terms (Buckle, 2014, p. 131).
Similarly, in Kant’s view, “The impersonal, formal, categorical imperative takes the place of
the eternal law. The natural law, therefore, as part of the lex naturalis, is no longer connected
with the eternal law, for the very reason that it can no longer be understood as part of the lex
naturalis, of the rational moral law. Furthermore, not enforceability but external physical force
is directly and necessarily included in the concept of law” (Rommen, 1998, p. 90). Kant’s
rational formalist argument prevented him from developing a doctrine of substantive value. To
this end, Max Scheler competed a lengthy critique of Kant’s pure formalism (Scheler, 2011, pp.
8-9, p. 113).① In this way, natural law ceased to have any substantive content and eventually
came to an end.

Conclusion
The shift from divine law to natural law seems to be an inevitable process, which was
already marked in ancient Greece: “The quest for the beginning, for the first things, becomes
now the philosophic or scientific analysis of the cosmos; the place of the divine law, in the
traditional sense of the term, where it is a code traced to a personal god, is replaced by a natural
order, which may even be called, as it was later to be called, a natural law—or at any rate,
to use a wider term, a natural morality. So the divine law, in the real and strict sense of the
term, is only the starting point, the absolutely essential starting point, for Greek philosophy,
but it is abandoned in the process. And if it is accepted by Greek philosophy, it is accepted
only politically, meaning for the education of the many, and not as something which stands
independently” (Strauss, 1989, p. 256). Later, divine law became a theoretical guarantee or an
ideological irrelevance, which was perhaps also an inevitable trend. Unlike classical natural
law, which relied on reason while being well aware of the perils of reason, modern natural law,
after “executing deism” (Heine, 2007, p. 78), had no alternative but to leave natural law, or even
the entire spiritual world to reason.
Although the separation of divine and natural law had already occurred to Cicero, the two

① Scheler once made a vicious comment on Kant. According to Scheler, Kant’s ethics is not half right or all wrong, but the “devil’s words” (Scheler, 1999, p.
715). The fundamental reason may lie in the fact that Kant was under the direct influence of Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius. Worst of all, neither Kant
nor Pufendorf had any real understanding of classical natural law. “Or was it not fateful that Pufendorf was well acquainted with scarcely a single Greek or
Scholastic, and that Kant, the watershed from which flow so many and such varied streams of modern thought, knew Aristotle and St. Thomas only from a
very imperfect history of philosophy?” (Rommen, 2007. p. 85). This was indeed an “extremely fateful fact.” Leibniz’s critique of Pufendorf can be found in
Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Buckle, 2014, p. 55) and The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy (Rommen,
2007, p. 88).
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did not drift apart. In modern times, Hobbes, who emphasized the distinction between ius and
lex (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.14), distinguished natural rights from natural law, which became no
more than a theoretical guarantee for natural rights. With the substantive theory of natural law
on the wane, when talking about natural law, people were in fact talking about natural rights.
Thus, natural law (lex naturalis) evolved into natural rights (ius naturale), or to say, natural law
was replaced by natural rights, which marked the ultimate victory of “anthropolodicy.” After
the American Revolution and the French Revolution, natural law as a disguise was dropped
and natural rights were openly pursued. In particular, the right to self-preservation became an
unconditional and absolute basis of natural law (Strauss, 2003, p. 185; Hobbes, 2003, p. 8, p.
15)—(Never expected) the quality of thought degenerated to such a point. Blaise Pascal said,
“Doubtless there are natural laws, but this fine reason having been corrupted, it corrupted
everything” (Pascal, 2004).
The result or manifestation of the corruption of reason is that “law” becomes “right”
and that “nature” becomes “world” and “resources.” Once rational natural law is faced with
widespread skepticism, the entire world of thought will fall into a new round of skepticism,
historicism and nihilism, which again need to be remedied by a newly emerged “new natural
law.” Natural law itself is in an “eternal cycle” or perpetual transition. As Heinrich Rommen
put it, “Yet it has always come back into jurisprudence whenever the human mind, weary of
the unsatisfying hunt for mere facts, has again turned to metaphysics, queen of the sciences”
(Rommen, 1998, p.28)①. In this regard, we are far less optimistic than Rommen was, as the
many revivals of natural law in history were not Nietzsche’s ewige Wiederkehr, but Schmitt’s
absinkende.
The revival of natural law in modern times may end up being a game of self-deconstruction
without full awareness of its problems. This game, along with modern relativism, cynicism,
historicism, skepticism and nihilism, forebodes mankind’s spiritual decay. Against such a
backdrop, a re-examination of classical natural law is not necessarily a “sovereign remedy,”
but it can at least temporarily break the spell of ewige Wiederkehr and allow natural law to truly
return to nature in the cosmological sense. Only in this way can treatment, redemption or other
alternatives possibly be found.

① Its original German version is entitled Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts (Leipzig: Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1936), whose literal translation into English should
be the Eternal Recurrence of Natural Law.
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